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Jennings: Jennings: Physician-Patient Relationship

Notes
The Physician-Patient Relationship:
The Permissibility of Ex Parte
Communications Between Plaintiff's

Treating Physicians and Defense Counsel
Brandt v. Pelican' and Brandt v. Medical Defense Associates2

I. INTRODUCTION
Ex parte interviews of nonparty witnesses are commonly used by
attorneys in determining whether witnesses have sufficiently valuable
information to warrant taking their deposition or using their testimony at trial
as well as in actually preparing witnesses to testify.' Although ex parte
interviews are accepted for most witnesses, ex parte contact between a
plaintiff's treating physician and a defendant's attorney raises the question of
whether such communications are inconsistent with the physician-patient
privilege and the physician's duty of confidentiality. Because of these
considerations, many states disallow such ex parte interviews.4
In the Brandt cases, the Missouri Supreme Court permitted ex parte
communications between a plaintiffs physicians and defense counsel. This
Note will examine the reasoning behind the court's decision and compare the
Brandt decision to various approaches taken by other jurisdictions to resolve
the apparent conflict between the physician-patient relationship and informal
discovery methods such as ex parte communications.

1. 856 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1993).
2. 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993).
3. Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1985) ("Personal interviews...
are an accepted, informal method of assembling facts and documents in preparation for
trial."); Lewis v. Roderick, 617 A.2d 119, 122 (R.I. 1992). See also Barbara Podlucky
Berens, Note, Defendants' Right to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews with Treating
PhysiciansIn Drug or Medical Device Cases, 73 MINN. L. R.v. 1451, 1451 (1989).

4. See infra note 77.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

A. Brandt v. Pelican [Brandt I]
Brandt I was a medical malpractice action brought by William Brandt
against Dr. George Pelican, a physician who treated him for Crohn's disease.5
In March of 1986, Mr. Brandt was referred to Dr. Pelican, a gastroenterologist, by his family physician, for treatment of a painful abscess near his anal
canal that occurred as a result of Crohn's disease.6 Dr. Pelican prescribed the
drug Flagyl on a long-term basis to treat the anal abscess.7 A side effect of
Flagyl is peripheral neuropathy, which is an "extremely painful condition
caused by damage to the nerves in the extremities."8 Dr. Pelican did not
warn Mr. Brandt of the side effects of Flagyl or advise him of the symptoms
of peripheral neuropathy so that he could stop taking Flagyl if any of the
symptoms appeared. 9
In September of 1986, Brandt returned to his family physician, complaining of numbness in his hands and feet.'0 Brandt was advised to discontinue
the use of Flagyl and was referred to Dr. Gary Myers, a neurologist, for
treatment." Dr. Myers diagnosed Brandt's condition to be persistent
peripheral neuropathy. 2
Mr. Brandt began seeing Dr. Ira Kodner in September of 1986 for
surgical treatment of the abscess. 3 Through
the use of surgical techniques,
4
the abscess finally healed by July of 1989.1
Mr. Brandt brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Pelican
alleging three counts of negligence: (1) Failing to inform him of the risk of
peripheral neuropathy; (2) failing to warn him to "be on the lookout for
symptoms of peripheral neuropathy"; and (3) failing to properly monitor him
while he was taking Flagyl. 5

5. Crohn's disease is "an inflammation of the bowel or digestive system, which
can occur periodically and then go into remission." Brandt 1, 856 S.W.2d at 659.
6. Id.at 660.
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.Peripheral neuropathy usually ceases once the patient stops taking Flagyl.
Occasionally, however, the peripheral neuropathy does not end with the discontinuation
of the medication. Such a condition is termed "persistent peripheral neuropathy." Id.
13. Id,
14. Id.
15. Id,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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During discovery, the plaintiff deposed both Dr. Myers and Dr.
Kodner.'6 Following these depositions, Dr. Myers and Dr. Kodner engaged
in ex parte interviews with Dr. Pelican and his attorney. 7 Neither Dr. Myers
nor Dr. Kodner were called by the plaintiff to testify. 8 Both doctors,
however, were called by the defense to testify as to their treatment of Mr.
Brandt and to give expert opinions. 9 The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Dr. Pelican.20 The plaintiff moved for a new trial, claiming that "both Dr.
Kodner and Dr. Myers changed their testimony from that given in their
respective depositions as a result of the ex parte contacts" thus entitling
plaintiff "to a new trial at which the changed testimony of Dr. Kodner and Dr.
Myers will not be admitted."'" The trial court held a post-trial evidentiary
hearing and ruled that the ex parte communications were not improper.'
Upon transfer,' the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
ruling, distinguishing a physician's duty of confidentiality from the physicianpatient privilege.24 The court held that when there is disclosure of confidential information by a physician outside of testimony or formal discovery, the
physician-patient privilege cannot be asserted.25 This holding was grounded
in the fact that the sole source of the physician-patient privilege in Missouri
is a statute,26 which applies only to "disclosure of confidential medical
information by testimony in court or by formal discovery."27 Therefore, in
Brandt I, there was no basis "for granting plaintiff a new trial because of his
physicians' out-of-court disclosures of medical information."" The Court
deferred discussion of the physicians' duty of confidentiality and liability for
extra-judicial disclosure of medical information to its related opinion, Brandt
v. Medical Defense Associates.29

16. Id,
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id,
20. Id, at 659.
21. Id.
at 661.
22. Id.The trial court noted that even if the ex parte communications were
improper, "there was no prejudice to the plaintiff created by the ex parte contacts."

Id.
23. There was no intermediate court decision. Id
24. Id. at 661.

25. Id.
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060 (Supp. 1993).
27. Brandt 1, 856 S.W.2d at 662. The court said that "there was no physician-

patient privilege under the common law in Missouri or elsewhere." 1d,
28. Id,
29. 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993) [Brandtfl]. Brandt I and Brandt H were both
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 5

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

B. Brandt v. Medical Defense Associates [Brandt IIJ
Brandt II arose out of Brandt L Following a jury verdict for the
defendant in Brandt I, the plaintiff filed Brandt 1I "seeking actual and punitive
damages based on civil conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty (Count I) and
civil conspiracy based on invasion of privacy (Count II) against Dr. Kodner,
Dr. Myers, Dr. Pelican, and Medical Defense Associates, the medical

malpractice liability insurer for Dr. Pelican in [Brandt ]."30 The defendants
filed motions to dismiss, which alleged that the plaintiff failed to state a cause
of action.3
The trial court granted the defendants' motions. 2 The
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District reversed, finding that
plaintiff had stated a cause of action against Dr. Kodner and Dr. Myers for
breach of fiduciary duty, and against Dr. Pelican and Medical Defense
Associates for aiding and abetting Dr. Kodner and Dr. Myers in committing
the tort of breach of fiduciary duty.33
The Missouri Supreme Court, upon transfer of the case from the court of
appeals, again asserted, as it did in Brandt I, that the physician-patient
privilege applies only to testimony in court or testimony during formal
discovery.34 The court held that a physician does have a "fiduciary duty of
confidentiality" that generally prohibits extra-judicial disclosures of confidential information, but it is separate and distinct from the "testimonial privilege"
that is found in Missouri Revised Statutes section 491.060(5)."5 Additionally, the Court held that when there is an issue joined to the litigation that
concerns the plaintiff s medical condition, the plaintiff will be considered to
have waived both the "testimonial privilege" and the "fiduciary duty of
confidentiality,"3 6 thus allowing ex parte contacts between plaintiff's treating
physicians and defense counsel.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Physician-PatientPrivilege
"Although the general policy of the law is to obtain as many facts as
possible about a controversy on trial, rules of evidence often exclude reliable

decided
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

on the same day.
Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 669.
Id.
Id,
Id
Id.
Id. See infra text accompanying note 117 for the text of this statute.
Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 674.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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testimony if it was acquired by the witness through some confidential
relation."37 One such privileged relationship is that of doctor and patient.38
This privilege did not exist at common law,39 and it was not until 1828 that
New York enacted the first physician-patient privilege statute in any common
law jurisdiction. 40 The notes to New York's 1828 legislative session reveal
two main policy justifications for establishing a physician-patient privilege.
First, the privilege was to promote public health by encouraging patients to
make full disclosure of medical information to their doctors.4' Second, the
legislators analogized communications between a doctor and patient to
privileged conversations between attorneys and clients and reasoned that the

37. Zechariah Chafee Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or
Obstructedby Closing the Doctor'sMouth on the Witness Stand, 52 YALE L.J. 607,

608 (1943).
38. Others include husband and wife, attorney and client, and priest and confessor.
Id. at 608.
39. Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tenn. 1965); Daniel W.
Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-PatientPrivilege and ProfessionalSecret, 39

SW. L.J. 661, 674-76 (1985).
40. Shuman, supra note 39, at 676 n.75. The statute read, "No person duly

authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be compelled to disclose any information
which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a professional character, and
which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a
physician, or to do any act for him, as a surgeon." N.Y. REV. STAT. 1829 II, 406, part
III, tit. 3, ch. VII, art. VIII, § 7. Missouri was the second state to enact such a
privilege statute. Robert A. Wade, Note, The Ohio Physician-PatientPrivilege:
Modified, Revised, and Defined,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1147, 1148 (1989).
41. Original Reports of the Revisers, vol. 5, p. 34 (1828) (cited in EDWARD W.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 105, at 224 n.86 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]) ("[U]nless such [physician-patient] consultations
are privileged, men will be incidentally punished by being obliged to suffer the
consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art, and without conviction
of offense.").
This rationale is also prominent in modem jurisdictions. See, e.g., id § 98, at
213 ("[T]he only purpose that could possibly justify the suppression in a law suit of
material facts learned by the physician is the encouragement of freedom of disclosure
by the patient so as to aid in the effective treatment of disease and injury."); Domako
v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Mich. 1991); Crist v. Moffat, 389 S.E.2d 41, 45 (N.C.
1990); Nelson v. Lewis, 534 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. 1987). See also Rowland H. Long,
The Physician-PatientPrivilegeStatutes ObstructJustice,25 INS. COUNS. J. 224,22425 (1958); Edmund M. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert
Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REv. 285, 290 (1942-43); Shuman,
supra note 39, at 664.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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private communications between a doctor and a patient are at least 42as
important as the information exchanged between an attorney and a client.
One prominent scholar has stated that a privilege is only justified when
the harm of the secrecy allowed in the courtroom because of the privilege is
outweighed by the benefit of the free communications fostered by the
privilege. 43 However, "[t]he validity of the [physician-patient] privilege has
44
been questioned by most of the leading evidence authorities in this country"
because the justifications for the privilege do not outweigh the harm caused
by the privilege. 5 Moreover, many commentators call for the abolition of

42. Original Reports of Revisers, vol. 5, p. 34 (1828) (cited in MCCORMICK,

supranote 41, § 105, at 224 n.86) ("The ground on which communications to counsel
are privileged, is the supposed necessity of a full knowledge of the facts, to advise

correctly, and to prepare for the proper defence or prosecution of a suit. But surely
the necessity of consulting a medical adviser, when life itself may be in jeopardy, is
still stronger.").
43. Chafee, supra note 37, at 608.
44. State ex rel. Grimm v. Ashmanskas, 690 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Or. 1984).

45. In response to the justification that the privilege is necessary to ensure proper
medical treatment, see Chafee, supra note 37, at 609 (stating that except for a few

highly disgraceful or very private conditions, "medical treatment is so valuable that
few would lose it to prevent facts from coming to light in court"); Long, supra note
41, at 224 ("There is no evidence that a patient will censor facts at the expense of
recovery, merely because he may know, if he lives in New England, that his physician
can be ordered to disclose his findings in court. There is no evidence that case

histories obtained by New England hospitals and clinics are not as full and complete
as those obtained by medical institutions in New York or Minnesota, where privileged
communication statutes exist."); Morgan, supranote 41, at 290 (noting that to assume
that the patient will be deterred from disclosing medical information to his or her
physician in absence of a privilige also supposes that the patient is anticipating a
lawsuit and is considering what he or she will want to say on the witness stand);
Shuman, supra note 39, at 664 ("Few seriously contend that these assumptions
accurately reflect patient decision-making behavior in the case of physical problems.").
In response to the justification that the physician-patient relationship is at least
as important as the attorney-client relationship, see MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 105,
at 224-25 ("As the client considers what he shall reveal to his lawyer he will often

have in mind the possibility of the exposure of his statements in court, for the lawyer's
office is the very anteroom of the courthouse. The patient, on the other hand, in most
instances, in consulting his doctor will have his thoughts centered on his illness or
injury and his hopes for betterment or cure, and the thought of some later disclosure
of his confidences in the courtroom would not usually be a substantial factor in
curbing his freedom of communication with his doctor."); W.A. Purrington, An
Abused Privilege,6 COLUM. L. REv. 388, 393-94 (1906) ("They were.., misled by
a false analogy between the patient consulting a medical man with no thought and with
little probability of litigation, and, in most cases, with no aversion to publicity, and the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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the privilege.46 In spite of criticism, a majority of jurisdictions have a
physician-patient privilege statute.47

client consulting an attorney upon matters of law with a strong likelihood of being
involved in litigation."). See also Chafee, supra note 37, at 609; Morgan, supranote
41, at 290.
46. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 105, at 228 ("More than a century
of experience with the statutes has demonstrated that the [physician-patient] privilege
in the main operates not as the shield of privacy but as the protector of fraud.
Consequently the abandonment of the privilege seems the best solution."); id. (stating
that the "evil results of the privilege [are] ...suppression of what is ordinarily the
best source of proof... [a] one-sided view of the facts upon which the court must act
...[and] [t]he complexities and perplexities which result from a statute which runs
against the grain of justice, truth and fair dealing"); 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2380(a), at 831 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("Ninety-nine per cent of the
litigation in which the privilege is invoked consists of three classes of cases-actions
on policies of life insurance where the deceased's misrepresentations of his health are
involved, actions for corporal injuries where the extent of the plaintiff's injury is at

issue, and testamentary actions where the testator's mental capacity is disputed. In all
of these the medical testimony is absolutely needed for the purpose of learning the
truth.")
47. ALASKA R. EVID. 504; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1982); ARK. R.
EVID. 503; CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107 (1987 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1994); DEL. R. EVID. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.241 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1994); HAW. R. EVID. 504; IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1979); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/8-802 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums Supp. 1993);
IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1993); KAN STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (1983); LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. art. 510 (West Supp. 1993); ME. R. EVID. 503; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-109 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 1986 & Supp.
1993); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 600.2157 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972 &
Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (Supp. 1993); MONT. R. CIV. P. 35(b)(2),
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (Supp. 1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 49.225 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1993); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976); N.M. R. EviD. 4-504; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L.
& R. 4504 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986); N.D.
R. EVID. 503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.235 (1993); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5929 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.34 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-6 to -11 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (Supp. 1993);
TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 509, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08 (West Supp.
1994); UTAH R. EID. 506, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(4) (1992); VT. R. EVID. 503,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Michie
Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West Supp. 1994); WIs. STAT.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Physician-patient privilege statutes share a number of characteristics.
First, the privilege statutes are generally evidentiary in nature and usually
govern only testimony, whether given in court or during formal discovery. 8
Therefore, physician-patient privilege statutes ordinarily do not regulate extrajudicial disclosures such as ex parte communications.4 9 Second, the privilege
belongs to the patient and can only be invoked, or waived, by the patient; the
physician cannot use the privilege for his or her own benefit." Third, "the

ANN. § 905.04 (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977).
48. Shuman, supra note 39, at 678 (citing CLINTON DEWITr, PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 27-28 (1958)). See also UNIF.

R. EviD. 503, 13A U.L.A. R. 503 (1986); infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
49. Shuman, supranote 39, at 678 (stating that such extrajudicial disclosures are
governed by professional ethics). It should be noted that many courts do not
distinguish between a physician-patient privilege that relates to testimony and the
physician-patient confidential relationship that concerns extra-judicial disclosures of
confidential information. It is not clear in all cases whether courts do not distinguish
between the "privilege" and the "confidential relationship" or whether they merely
decline to use terminology that will distinguish the relationships. For example, in
Church's Fried Chicken No. 1040 v. Hanson, 845 P.2d 824, 828 (N.M. Ct. App.
1992), cert. denied,844 P.2d 827 (N.M. 1993), the court stated that "[j]urisdictions
which have upheld the right to conduct ex parte interviews of a plaintiff's treating
physician have generally premised such right upon their determination that commencement of an action for personal injuries constitutes a waiver by the plaintiff of the
physician-patient privilege in that proceeding." This conclusion that a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege is the premise upon which ex parte communications is
allowed is clearly incorrect. Only the physician-patient confidential relationship
applies to ex parte communications-the physician-patient privilege applies only to
testimony. But cf Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585,
590 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("[The physician-patient privilege statute] applies to the general
disclosure of information rather than the limited area of testimony."); However, some
courts have expressly stated that only the physician-patient privilege exists and refuse
to recognize a confidential relationship. See id, at 590 ("[The physician-patient
privilege statute] applies to the general disclosure of information rather than the limited
area of testimony."); Nelson, 534 A.2d at 721-23 (stating that the physician-patient
privilege statute creates a confidential relationship that bars ex parte conferences);
Domako, 475 N.W.2d at 34 n.8 (finding that if a separate fiduciary relationship
between doctor and patient existed, it was "subsumed by the physician-patient
privilege").
50. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 103, at 219; Shuman, supra note 39, at 678.
See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.235 (1991) ("1. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased
patient. 2. The person who was the doctor may claim the privilege but only on behalf
of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary."); Sarphie v. Rowe, 618 So. 2d 905 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a
chiropractor may claim the privilege on behalf of the patients in disallowing the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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privilege is not absolute" and all jurisdictions provide for a waiver of the
privilege in certain circumstances."

B. The Physician-PatientConfidentialRelationship
The physician-patient confidential relationship is distinct from the
physician-patient privilege and differs in several ways. 2 First, the physicianpatient privilege is more narrow in scope than the confidential relationship-whereas the privilege governs the disclosure of confidential information
during testimony, the confidential relationship is concerned with extra-judicial
disclosures of confidential information.53 Second, in contrast to the privilege, which is purely statutory,54 the confidential relationship is generally not
derived from statute, but is a "court-created effort to preserve the treating
physician's fiduciary responsibilities during the litigation process.""5 Finally,

plaintiff to gain access to the chiropractor's patient lists); Klieger v. Alby, 373 N.W.2d
57, 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) ("[The] privilege is owned by the patient, not the medical
doctor."); UNIF. R. EVID. 503(c) (same).
51. Shuman, supra note 39, at 678. See also Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857,

861 (N.J. 1985) (stating that the physician-patient is not absolute).
For statutory waivers of the physician-patient privilege, see e.g. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-9-40 (Harrison 1990); HAW. R. EvD. 504(d)(3); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4495b, § 508 (West 1976 & Supp. 1994); UNIF. R. EvmD. 503(d)(3).
For case law waiving the physician-patient privilege in the absence of statute or
rule of evidence, see Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 891, 899-900

(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the privilege is not waived upon filing the lawsuit,
but only when the party chooses "between the existing privilege and the desired
testimony"); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (Wash. 1988) ("A patient may
waive this privilege by putting his or her physical condition in issue.").
See also infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.

52. Crist v. Moffatt, 389 S.E.2d 41, 45 (N.C. 1990). See also Manion v. N.P.W.
Medical Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("The
prohibition against unauthorized contacts between defense counsel and a plaintiff's
treating physician is, moreover, completely separate and distinct from the statutory
physician-patient privilege.").
However, some courts fail to distinguish between the confidential relationship and
the privilege. See supra note 49.
53. Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 590 (stating that the testimonial privilege is more
limited than the confidential relationship); Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 828 (Ala.
1973) ("[W]hether or not testimony may be barred at trial does not necessarily control
the issue of liability for unauthorized extra-judicial disclosures by a doctor.").
54. Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 45.
55. Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 593. See Church's Fried Chicken No. 1040 v.
Hanson, 845 P.2d 824, 829 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 844 P.2d 827 (N.M.
1993) (ex parte communications are improper because of public policy considerations,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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"[tihe statutory privilege determines whether certain information may be
disclosed" whereas the confidential relationship "affects defense counsel's
methods, not the substance of what is discoverable." 6 For example, the
confidential relationship may dictate whether defense counsel can conduct an
ex parte interview or whether he or she must depose the doctor, but will not
determine what information may be discovered or introduced into evidence.
The starting point in defining the physician-patient confidential
relationship is the physician's ethical duty not to disclose confidential
information. "[T]he established ethical code of the medical profession itself
unequivocally recognizes the confidential nature of the doctor-patient
relationship."" The physician's code of ethics generally forbids disclosure
of a patient's medical record without consent of the patient. 8 Breach of this

despite the nonexistence of a physician-patient privilege statute at the time the lawsuit
was commenced).
56. Manion, 676 F. Supp. at 593.
57. Home, 287 So. 2d at 829.
58. The physician's code consists of three prongs: "(1) The Hippocratic Oath;
(2) the American Medical Association's (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics; and (3)
The Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA (1984 ed.)." Petrillo v.
Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (I11.App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 505
N.E.2d 361 (II1. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987) (limited in Morgan v.
County of Cook, 625 N.E.2d 136, 954-55 (I11.App. Ct. 1993)).

The first prong of the physician's code of ethics, the Hippocratic Oath, states:
"[All1 that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of
my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be spread abroad,
I will keep secret and will never reveal." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 717
(25th ed. 1990).
The second prong, the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics states: "[A]
physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the
law." THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
quoted in Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 958.
The third prong, the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council ofthe AMA, states:
"Mhe information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship
between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree .... The
physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the

express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law." THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 5.06, quoted

in Petrillo,499 N.E.2d at 958 [hereinafter CURRENT OPINIONS].
However, in most instances the filing of a lawsuit by a patient that concerns a
medical issue will constitute consent to disclosure to certain third persons. See
Jacqueline M. Asher et al., Ex Parte Interview with Plaintiff's Treating Physicians-The Offensive Use ofthe Physician-PatientPrivilege, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 501,
506-07 (1990).
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ethical duty may cause the state body that governs medical licensing to
censure the doctor, or to suspend or revoke his or her license. 9 However,
conduct that is unethical does not necessarily subject the physician to legal
liability and does not govern the legal issue of whether extra-judicial
disclosures are allowed during the course of a lawsuit.' Therefore it is
necessary to determine the extent to which the physician-patient confidential
relationship is defined by state law.
Most jurisdictions recognize the existence of the physician-patient
confidential relationship as a matter of state law,6' and generally provide a
cause of action against the physician for the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information.62 There are four theories under which courts have
recognized the existence of the physician-patient relationship and have allowed
recovery for the breach of this relationship. 3

59. See OR. REv. STAT. § 677.190(5) as quoted in Humphers v. First Interstate
Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 535 (Or. 1985)) ("disqualifying or otherwise disciplining
a physician for 'wilfully or negligently divulging a professional secret"'); Anker v.
Brodnitz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) ("A doctor who discloses his
patient's confidences without authority opens himself to a charge of professional
misconduct."); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tenn. 1965) ("[A]
doctor's license may be revoked when the licensee has been guilty of unprofessional
conduct, and such conduct is defined as 'the willful betraying of a professional
secret.'"); Wenninger v. Muesing, 240 N.W.2d 333,337 (Minn. 1976) ("[A] physician
who discloses confidential information about his patient to another in a private
interview may be subject to... professional discipline for unprofessional conduct.").

60. Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487, 492 (D. Kan. 1991) ("The court finds the
code of ethics inapplicable to the issues before the court. First, it is not binding law.
Second, the issue is not whether the physician-patient relationship is confidential, it is
whether there is a privilege in the patient to prevent the disclosure of information
related to the patient."); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 114 (Okla. 1988)
(concluding that "ethical standards are aspirational in nature and not enforceable by
law").
Moreover, acts that are prohibited by law are not necessarily unethical. Manion,
676 F. Supp. at 595 (noting that the physician who engaged in ex parte communications did not necessarily act unethically, but was not allowed to make such contacts

as a matter of public policy).
61. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. But see Garner v. Ford Motor

Co., 61 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D. Alaska 1973) (asserting that state law is not "germane to a
determination of the proper means of discovery in an action once it has been removed
to federal court"); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30,34 n.8 (Mich. 1991) (finding that
if a separate fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient existed, it was
"subsumed by the physician-patient privilege").
62. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.

63. See generally Mary Droll Feighny, The Physician-PatientPrivilege: May
Defense Counsel Conduct E ParteInterviews with Plaintiff's TreatingPhysician?,J.
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First, some states assert that the physician's duty of confidentiality is
contractual in nature, and the unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information is a breach of an implied contract.' These courts find that most
patients are aware of the physician's ethical duty of confidentiality and
therefore expect any information revealed to the physician not to be disclosed.65 It is this expectation of secrecy that is protected by imposing an
implied contract.'
Second, a number of jurisdictions have held that a physician's extrajudicial disclosures of a plaintiffs medical information is an invasion of

KAN.

B. ASS'N, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 8; Lonette E. Lamb, Note, To Tell or Not to Tell:

Physician'sLiabilityfor Disclosureof ConfidentialInformation About a Patient, 13
CUMB. L. REv. 617 (1983); Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician'sTort Liabilityfor
UnauthorizedDisclosureof ConfidentialInformationAbout Patient,48 A.L.R. 4th 668
(1986); and infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. But see Berry v. Moench, 331
P.2d 814, 818-19 (Utah 1958) (treating unauthorized extra-judicial disclosure of
confidential information as a case in defamation, and treating the confidential
relationship merely as a factor in determining whether doctor had qualified privilege
under defamation).
64. Home, 287 So. 2d at 831-32; Petrillo 499 N.E.2d at 961 ("There is an
implied promise, arising when the physician begins treating the patient, that the
physician will refrain from engaging in conduct that is inconsistent with the 'good
faith' required of a fiduciary."). See also Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429
N.W.2d 891, 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). But see Pierce v. Caday, 422 S.E.2d 371,
374 (Va. 1992) (expressly rejecting a contract cause of action for breach of
confidential relationship by physician).
65. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ("Almost every member of the public is
aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath .... "); Home,
287 So. 2d at 832:
[P]ublic knowledge of the ethical standards of the medical profession or
widespread acquaintance with the Hippocratic Oath's secrecy provision or
the AMA's Principles of Ethics or ...

[licensing requirements] ...

singly

or together may well be sufficient justification for reasonable expectation
on a patient's part that the physician has promised to keep confidential all
information given by the patient.
Cf CURRENT OPINIONS, supranote 58, § 5.07, quoted in Petrillo,499 N.E.2d at
958 ("Both the protections of confidentiality and the appropriate release of information
in records is the rightful expectation of the patient. A physician should respect the
patient's expectations of confidentiality concerning medical records that involve the
patient's care and treatment.").
66. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ("The promise of secrecy is as much an
express warranty as the advertisement of a commercial entrepreneur."); Horne,287 So.
2d at 831 (quoting Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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privacy. 7 Jurisdictions that recognize this cause of action generally find that
extra-judicial disclosures of a patient's medical information through ex parte
communications can constitute a "public disclosure of private facts about the
plaintiff."68 The reasoning behind recognizing an invasion of privacy cause
of action is that disclosures "of intimate details of a patient's health may
amount to unwarranted publicization of one's private affairs with which the
public has no legitimate concern such as to cause outrage, mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."69
Third, some jurisdictions find that the confidential relationship merely
exists based on public policy.7
These states assert that extra-judicial
disclosures of a plaintiff s medical information constitute a tortious breach of
confidence or breach of fiduciary relationship.7' This tort is usually based
upon the fiduciary relationship that exists between the physician and
patient.72 This cause of action has been extended in some states so that an

67. Home, 287 So. 2d at 831-32; Allen v. Smith, 368 S.E.2d 924, 926 (W. Va.
1988) (supposing that mental health patient would have cause of action for invasion
of privacy when psychiatrist released her medical records to her husband in divorce
proceeding, but not deciding the issue since such an action was barred by the statute
of limitations). But see Martin v. Baehler, Civ. A.No. 916-11-008, 1993 WL 258843,
at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 20, 1993) (rejecting an invasion of privacy claim); Alberts
v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Mass.), cert. denied,474 U.S. 1013 (1985) (stating
that there can be no recovery under invasion of privacy for a "physician's violation of
the duty of confidentiality"); Humphers, 696 P.2d at 532 (rejecting an invasion of
privacy claim when a physician made an unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information). Cf Wenninger, 240 N.W.2d at 337.
68. See, e.g., Home, 287 So. 2d at 830; Martin, 1993 WL 258843, at *1
(rejecting plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim, but stating that the only possible action
would lie in the category of public disclosure of private facts).
There are four types of invasion of privacy actions recognized at common law:
(1) appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness; (2) intrusion upon plaintiff's privacy
or private affairs; (3) public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff; and (4)

placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. Id.
69. Home, 287 So. 2d at 830. See also Wenninger, 240 N.W.2d at 337.
70. E.g., Pierce, 422 S.E.2d at 372 (confidentiality is imposed in the doctor/patient relationship without any agreement).
71. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ("By its very definition, the term 'fiduciary
relationship' imports the notion that if a wrong arises, the same remedy exists against
the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of
the cestui que trust."); Home, 287 So. 2d at 828; Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 116; Pierce,
422 S.E.2d at 372. Cf Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (finding that "a cause of action
exists against a doctor who without authority discloses his patient's confidences," but

failing to precisely state the nature of the action).
72. E.g., Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) ("We are

of the opinion that members of a profession, especially the medical profession, stand
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action will lie against anyone who, "with the requisite 3state of mind, induces
a violation of the physician's duty of confidentiality.0

Finally, some states find that the confidential relationship is either
expressly or impliedly created by statute and establish a cause of action in
response to an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information that is in
violation of such a statute.74

C. Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintif's Treating
Physiciansand Defense Counsel
As previously stated, ex parte interviews of nonparty witnesses are a
common practice used by attorneys in preparing witnesses." However, many
states have established an exception to this practice by finding that the
confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship prohibits such ex parte
communications without the patient's express consent.76 The states are split
as to whether ex parte communications between a plaintiffs treating
physicians and defense counsel are allowed as a matter of state law. 77 The

in a confidential or fiduciary capacity to their patients.").
73. Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 119. See also Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 803
("[P]articipation in breaches of trust must also apply to one who participates in or
induces the breach of any fiduciary duty."). Cf Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (finding
that a cause of action did lie against an insurer who induced a doctor to disclose
confidential information, but failing to define the nature of the cause of action). But
see Alexander, 177 A.2d at 146 (those who induce a physician to breach the
confidential relationship should merely have their actions "condemned").
74. Martin, 1993 WL 258843 at *4 (finding a confidential relationship based on
Delaware's evidentiary privilege and stating that "the breach of this duty constitutes
a tort"); Jordan,429 N.W.2d at 899 (basing prohibition of ex parte interviews in part
on interpretation of MICH. CT. R. 2.302(b)(1)(b)); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W.
831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (finding an implied cause of action from the state's licensing
statute); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 58
N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945) (finding a cause of action in a state statute
prohibiting disclosure of mental institution records); Shaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d
134, 136 (S.D. 1974): Berry, 331 P.2d at 817 (reading the Utah privilege statute as
creating a confidential relationship); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (Wash.
1988) (reading the physician-patient privilege as prohibiting ex parte interviews).
75. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
76. See generally Daniel P. Jones, Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex Parte
Interview with Injured Party's Treating Physician, 50 A.L.R. 4th 714 (1986). See
infra note 77.
77. See generally Zelin, supra note 63.
The following jurisdictions do not allow ex parte communications between a
plaintiff's treating physicians and defense counsel: Louisiana, LA. CODE EVID. ANN.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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distinction between the states that allow ex parte communications and those

art. 510(E) (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (Revised June 25, 1993, by 1993 La. Acts 988,
limiting any waiver of the physician-patient privilege only to testimony at trial or
formal discovery. There is no case interpreting this provision in Louisiana.); North
Dakota, Bohrer v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 217, 218 (D.N.D.
1987); Ohio, Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Alabama, Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973); Arizona, Duquette v.
Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); California, Torres v. Superior
Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Colorado, Fields v. McNamara, 540
P.2d 327 (Colo. 1975); Florida, Phillips v. Ficarra, 618 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993); Illinois, Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), appeal
denied, 505 N.E.2d 361 (Ill.), cert. denied,483 U.S. 1007 (1987) (limited in Morgan
v. County of Cook, 625 N.E.2d 136, 954-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)) (allowing ex parte
communications between employer medical facility and employee doctor when the
medical facility was allegedly vicariously liable); Iowa, Roosevelt Hotel Ltd.
Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1986) (the court refused to force
plaintiff to issue authorization for ex parte contacts); Montana, Jaap v. District Court
of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, 623 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Mont. 1981); New Hampshire,
Nelson v. Lewis, 534 A.2d 720 (N.H. 1987); New Mexico, Church's Fried Chicken
No. 1040 v. Hanson, 845 P.2d 824 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 844 P.2d 847
(N.M. 1993); New York, Stoller v. Moo Young Jun, 499 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986); North Carolina, Crist v. Moffat, 389 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 1990); South Dakota,
Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974) (by implication); Washington, Loudon
v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1988); Wisconsin, Klieger v. Alby, 373 N.W.2d 57
(Wis. 1985); Wyoming, Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1066 (Wyo. 1992) (by
implication in dictum).
The following jurisdictions do allow ex parte communications between a
plaintiff's treating physician and a defendant's attorney: Arkansas, King v. Ahrens, 798
F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Ark. 1992); South Carolina, Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85
(D.S.C. 1991); Kansas, Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487 (D. Kan. 1991); District of
Columbia, Alston v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35 (D. D.C. 1985);
Alaska, Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Delaware, Green v.
Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Georgia, Orr v. Sievert, 292
S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (by implication); Idaho, Pearce v. Ollie, 826 P.2d 888
(Idaho 1992); Kentucky, Roberts v. Estep, 845 S.W.2d 544 (Ky. 1993); Michigan,
Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1991); Minnesota, Blohm v. Minneapolis
Urological Surgeons, 449 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1989) (applying MINN. STAT. § 595.02
(1988), which expressly allows "informal discussion" between treating physicians and
defense attorneys in medical malpractice actions); Missouri, Brandt v. Medical Defense
Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993); New Jersey, Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857
(N.J. 1985); Oklahoma, Bryson v. Tillinghast 749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988) (holding that
the physician-patient privilege does not extend to extra-judicial disclosures made in
criminal cases); Rhode Island, Lewis v. Roderick, 617 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1992);
Tennessee, Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965) (refusing to recognize
a physician-patient privilege at all).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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that prohibit them is not whether a confidential relationship exists,78 but the
breadth of the confidential relationship and the scope of the waiver of that
relationship implied by the patient filing a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs
medical condition is an issue.79 The choice of whether or not to extend
the physician-patient privilege 0 or the physician-patient confidential
relationship to prohibit ex parte communications as a matter of law customarily requires balancing of competing policy considerations.8' A court generally
weighs "the patient's privacy interest in non-disclosure, on the one hand, and
the public's interest in full disclosure to obtain a just disposition of the
controversy, on the other."8"
The policy arguments favoring the prohibition of ex parte communications are broad and diverse in scope.83 The first policy justification for
prohibiting ex parte interviews is that the confidential nature of the physicianpatient relationship ensures that "the patient will receive the best medical
treatment by encouraging full and frank disclosure of medical history and
symptoms by a patient to his doctor" and ex parte contacts jeopardize such
free disclosure. 4 A second argument advanced is that ex parte contacts

78. On the contrary, most of the states that allow ex parte communications also
recognize the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. See King, 798 F.
Supp. at 1380; Alston, 107 F.R.D. at 37 n.2 ("[B]y bringing an action.., a plaintiff
waives the physician-patient privilege, but only to the extent that attending physicians
may be required to testify on pretrial deposition with respect to the injuries sued
upon."); Stempler, 495 A.2d at 861. See also infra note 108.
79. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 49.
81. Courts that prohibit ex parte communications by a physician usually state
"public policy" as a justification. See King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373 ("Cases supporting
the prohibition of ex parte communications exhibit concern for the existence of public
policy considerations"); Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc. 676 F.Supp.
585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("[T]he basis of the prohibition is public policy").
82. Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1984). See also Stempler,495 A.2d
at 861 (The patient does not enjoy "an absolute right, but rather he possesses a limited
right against such disclosure, subject to exceptions prompted by the supervening
interest of society."). Cf Shuman, supra note 39, at 661 ("The need for personal
privacy in communications and the need for probative evidence at trials are like
separate melodies within the same musical composition.").
83. See Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 45 ("The rationales underlying the rule prohibiting
ex parte contacts with nonparty treating physicians encompass and extend beyond those
purposes enumerated [to support the physician-patient privilege] to embrace other
grounds as well.").
84. Duquette, 778 P.2d at 640 (citation omitted). See also Home, 287 So. 2d at
830; Petrillo,499 N.E.2d at 962; Wenninger v. Muesing, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Minn.
1976); Crist, 389 N.E.2d at 45; Stempler, 495 A.2d at 860 (unwarranted disclosures
may deter the patient from revealing his or her symptoms during treatment).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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should be prohibited because "the public has a widespread belief that
information given to a physician in confidence will not be disclosed to third
parties absent legal compulsion... and the public has a right to have this
expectation realized."85 Third, ex parte contacts should be disallowed in
order to protect the physician.8" Even though the physician has a right to
refuse to engage in an ex parte interview, such a right of refusal does not
sufficiently protect the physician from the pressure "brought to bear on the
physician when he or she is faced with a request for an ex parte interview by
a defense attorney."87 Additionally, a physician is not trained in legal
matters and may not realize the scope of his or her ability to engage in an ex
parte conference, 88 and overstepping those bounds may result in a breach of
the physician's code of ethics,89 charges of professional misconduct,' and

85. Duquette, 778 P.2d at 640. AccordHorne, 287 So. 2d at 831; Petrillo, 499

N.E.2d at 960 ("[T]he public, and specifically a patient, has the right to rely on
physicians to adhere to medical ethics and thereby protect the confidential relationship
existing between a patient and his physician."); Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 584; Crist,389
S.E.2d at 46 (quoting Duquette, 778 P.2d at 640). Cf notes 64-65, supra.
86. King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373; Duquette, 778 P.2d at 640-41; Crist, 389 N.E.2d

at 47.
87. Duquette, 778 P.2d at 640 (stating that a physician is not legally trained and
may not understand the distinction between formal and informal discovery, and that
substantial overlap between the insurer defending the medical malpractice defendant
and the insurer of the physician witness might make a physician witness feel compelled
to cooperate with the defense). Accord King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373; Manion, 676 F.
Supp. at 594-95 (large potential for impropriety exists when defense counsel represents
the insurance carrier of the treating physician); Pearce,826 P.2d at 907 (Bistline, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership,394 N.W.2d
at 357; Anker v. Brodnitz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Crist,389
S.E.2d at 47 (same).
88. Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641; Pearce, 826 P.2d at 908; Roosevelt Hotel Ltd.

Partnership,394 N.W.2d at 357 ("We do not mean to question the integrity of doctors
and lawyers or to suggest that we must control discovery in order to assure their
ethical conduct. We are concerned, however, with the difficulty of determining
whether a particular piece of information is relevant to the claim being litigated ....
Asking the physician, untrained in law to assume this burden ... is unfair to the
physician."); Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 47 (quoting Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641.).
Some courts have also said that the defense, although trained in legal issues,
cannot accurately determine the scope of the plaintiff's waiver of the privilege.
Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership,394 N.W.2d at 357; Anker, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 585

("[I]t would ... often be difficult for the defense to determine on its own if and to
what extent the physician-patient privilege was waived.").
89. See King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373; Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641; Pearce,826 P.2d

at 908; Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. at Detroit, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 891, 900 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (physician's ethical duty favors a bar on ex parte interviews).
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legal liability for breach of confidential relationship. 9' Fourth, many courts
disallow ex parte communications, in part, out of respect for the physician's
ethical duty of confidentiality. ' Fifth, some courts state that discovery
procedures are sufficiently broad to allow the defense to acquire all the
information they need from a plaintiffs treating physicians, and resort to
"informal discovery" is neither necessary or mandated under the rules of civil
procedure.93
Advocates favoring ex parte communications between plaintiff s treating
physicians and defense counsel generally present the following policy
qualifications. First, ex parte interviews are quicker and more efficient than

formal discovery in that they reduce the time needed to prepare for trial. 94

They "eliminate the cost and difficulties involved in holding and scheduling
formal depositions with all parties present,"95 provide "a cost-efficient way
'
of completely excluding nonessential witnesses from the list,"96
and facilitate

"early evaluation and settlement of claims,"'97 thereby reducing the expense
of litigation. Second, many courts recognize as "a general proposition...

90. Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641. See also Pearce, 826 P.2d 908; Anker, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 585; Quarles, 389 S.W.2d at 250.
91. Duquette, 778 P.2d at 641. See also Pearce,826 P.2d at 908; Roosevelt Hotel
Ltd. Partnership,394 N.W.2d at 357.
92. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797 (finding public policy prohibits ex parte
communications and that such public policy is based, in part, on the code of medical
ethics and the State Medical Licensing Statute); Home, 287 So. 2d at 829 ("When the
wording of Alabama's state licensing statute is considered alongside the accepted
precepts of the medical profession itself, it would seem to establish clearly that public
policy in Alabama requires that information obtained by a physician in the course of
a doctor-patient relationship be maintained in confidence .... "); Jordan,429 N.W.2d
at 900 ("The physician's ethical duty of loyalty and the implied promise of confidentiality which arise upon treatment favor a bar on ex parte interviews .... "). See also
Duquette, 778 P.2d at 640; Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 958-59.
93. See Garner v. Ford Motor Company, 61 F.R.D. 22, 24 (D. Alaska 1973)
(Rabinowitz, J., concurring); King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373; Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D.
443, 445 (D.N.D. 1981); Fields, 540 P.2d at 328; Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership,
394 N.W.2d at 357; Stoller v. Moo Young Jun, 499 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986).
See also Jacqueline M. Asher et al., supra note 58, at 512 ("In virtually every
case barring ex parte contact, the most compelling argument against such contact was
that the formal rules of civil procedure do not provide for informal ex parte
interviews.").
94. King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373; Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128
(D.D.C. 1983); Langdon, 745 P.2d at 1373; Lewis, 617 A.2d at 122.
95. Lewis, 617 A.2d at 122.
96. Id.
97. King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373.
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[that] no party to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to any

witness's evidence. Absent a privilege no party is entitled to restrict an
opponent's access to a witness ...

."" This is basically a fairness argument:

the plaintiff should not have free access to a witness without the defense being
accorded similar treatment, and the plaintiff should not be able to use the
confidential relationship as both a shield and a sword. 9 Third, "court rules
in [some] jurisdiction[s] [do] not expressly prohibit such ex parte interviews."' 0 Related to this argument is the notion that allowing ex parte
contacts is consistent with the purpose of discovery rules, which is to "secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."'' Fourth,
the physician can refuse to engage in ex parte communications, and may use
discretion in deciding 2how much information to disclose, thus protecting his
or her ethical duties.

0

D. Waiver of the Physician-PatientPrivilege and the
Physician-PatientConfidential Relationship
A finding that the physician-patient privilege and the physician-patient
confidential relationship have been waived0 3 is the legal mechanism by

98. Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 128. Accord Stempler, 495 A.2d at 864 (quoting Doe, 99

F.R.D. at 128.); King, 798 F. Supp. at 1373-74.
99. For an example of a plaintiff using the physician's duty of confidentiality
unfairly, see Domako, 475 N.W.2d at 34 n.5 (stating that certain actions of the plaintiff

were apparently "designed to obtain a tactical advantage, not to protect confidentiality").
100. Lewis, 617 A.2d at 122. See also King, 798 F. Supp. at 1379; Green, 501
A.2d at 1258.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See also Bryant, 136 F.R.D. at 492 ("The court believes
that the mandate of FED. R. Civ. P. 1 is best observed by permitting ex parte
communications with fact witnesses, including plaintiffs treating physicians."); Green,
501 A.2d at 1258 ("This Court will not condone the use of the formal discovery rules
as a shield against defense counsel's informal access to a witness when these rules
were intended to simplify trials by expediting the flow of litigation."); Domako, 475
N.W.2d at 35-36 ("IT]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that discovery rules are to
be liberally construed... to further the ends ofjustice. Restricting parties to formal
methods of discovery would not aid in the search for the truth, and it would only serve
to complicate trial preparation ....Discovery should.., promote the discovery of the

true facts and circumstances of a controversy, rather than aid in their concealment.")
(citation omitted); Stempler, 495 A.2d at 863 ("The policy of law is to allow all
competent, relevant evidence to be produced, subject only to a limited number of
privileges.").
102. See infra note 113.

103. See supra note 49 for discussion of judicial recognition of a separate
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which a court allows ex parte communications between a plaintiffs treating
physicians and defense counsel.c 4
Generally, the plaintiff waives the physician-patient privilege upon the
filing of a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs medical condition is an issue.'05

"privilege" and "confidential relationship."
104. E.g., Church's Fried Chicken No. 1040 v. Hanson, 845 P.2d 824, 828 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 844 P.2d 847 (N.M. 1993) ("Jurisdictions which have
upheld the right to conduct ex parte interviews of a plaintiff's treating physician have
generally premised such right upon their determination that commencement of an
action for personal injuries constitutes a waiver by the plaintiff of the physician-patient
privilege in that proceeding."). Note that the court here seems to use the term
"privilige" to refer to the whole physician-patient relationship. See supra note 49.
105. WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 2389 ("The whole reason for the privilege is the
patient's supposed unwillingness that the ailment should be disclosed to the world at
large; hence the bringing of a suit in which the very declaration, and much more the
proof, discloses the ailment to the world at large, is of itself an indication that the
supposed repugnancy to disclosure does not exist."). See also Mattison v. Poulen, 353
A.2d 327, 330 (Vt. 1976) ("But it is neither human, natural, nor understandable to
claim protection from exposure by asserting a privilege for communications to doctors,
at the very same time when the patient is parading before the public the mental or
physical condition as to which he consulted the doctor, by bringing an action for
damages arising from such condition."). Accord Collins v. Bair, 268 N.E.2d 95, 98
(Ind. 1971); State v. Long, 165 S.W. 748, 755 (Mo. 1914); Stempler v. Speidell, 495
A.2d 857, 859 (N.J. 1985). See infra notes 106-07 for citation of some states that
allow for such a waiver. But see Bond v. Independent Order of Foresters, 421 P.2d
351, 353 (Wash. 1966) ("The bringing of an action for personal injuries does not
constitute a waiver ofthe [physician-patient privilege] statute.") However, Washington
has since amended its privilege statute to provide that upon filing a lawsuit, the
plaintiff must expressly waive the privilege within ninety days. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5.60.060 (West Supp. 1993).
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Many states provide for such a waiver by statute,1 16 but a few states provide
for a waiver of the privilege through judicially created doctrine.10 7
A waiver of the physician-patient privilege does not necessarily mean that
the physician-patient confidential relationship has been waived as well. 0 8
States that prohibit ex parte communications hold that the filing of a lawsuit
is not a constructive waiver of the physician-patient confidential relationship,
even if the physician-patient privilege has been constructively waived by the
plaintiff placing his or her medical condition at issue.0 9 Only those states

106. E.g. Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (Harrison 1990); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-427(d) (1993); Michigan, MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.314(B)(2)(stating that
if a party asserts the physician-patient privilege with regard to confidential medical
information, then that party may not later present any evidence relating to that
information), MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2157 (West Supp. 1993); Texas, TEx
R. Civ. EvID. 509(d)(4), TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b § 5.08(g)(4) (West
Supp. 1994); Vermont, VT. R. EVID. 503(d)(3) (1983). See also Lewis v. Roderick,
617 A.2d 119, 121 (R.I. 1992) (concluding that the legislature's intent was "to create
a qualified, nonabsolute privilege that would protect a patient's interest in privacy and
yet not hamper discovery in medical-malpractice actions"). But see State ex rel.
Grimm v. Ashmanskas, 690 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Or. 1985) (interpreting OR. R. EVID.
511 as providing that waiver does not occur upon the commencement of a lawsuit, but
upon deposition of a treating physician by the plaintiff).
107. Collins, 268 N.E.2d at 98; Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 894, 897
(N.D. 1974) (holding that an implied waiver occurs at the "initiation of a malpractice
action" and refusing to decide whether such an implied waiver occurs in other types
of proceedings); Mattison, 353 A.2d at 330 (however, the Vermont physician-patient
privilege statute has been revised since this case and now expressly provides for a
waiver upon commencement of a lawsuit when the plaintiff's medical condition is an
issue); Wardel v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1066 (Wyo. 1992).
108. Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney 394 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa
1986) ("[W]e cannot accept... that the plaintiff's suit totally waives the confidential
nature of the physician-patient relationship. It only waives the application of the
privilege, which is confined by the statute to a testimonial setting, and does not speak
to ex parte communications in a nontestimonial setting."); State ex rel. Stufflebam v.
Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by State ex rel.
Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989) ("Waiver of the physician-patient
privilege does not terminate all effects of the physician-patient relationship."); State ex
rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Mo. 1989), abrogatedby Brandt v.
Pelican, 856 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1993). See supra note 78.
109. "Constructive waiver" is the waiver that is deemed to occur upon the filing
of a lawsuit in which the plaintiff's medical condition is an issue. Manion v. N.P.W.
Medical Ctr. of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 594 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Home v.
Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 828 (Ala. 1973); Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634,
637 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 891,
899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (Wash. 1988).
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that allow ex parte communications find that the physician-patient confidential
relationship has been waived upon the filing of a lawsuit in which the
plaintiff's medical condition is an issue." °
Once the plaintiff has filed a lawsuit in which his or her medical
condition is an issue, a court that allows ex parte contacts may use one of two
methods to permit such contacts. Some courts require the plaintiff to issue
written authorizations to his or her treating physicians consenting to their
future ex parte disclosures of information before the defendant can interview
them."' In other states, the court takes a passive role with respect to ex
parte communications and finds that authorizations are not necessary before
a physician can engage in ex parte communications." 2 Whichever method
is used, the physician's participation in an ex parte interview is voluntary, and

the physician retains the right to refuse to take part in an ex parte interview. 113

E. Development of MissouriLaw Concerningthe Physician-Patient
Relationship and Ex Parte Communications
In 1835, Missouri became the second state"' to recognize the physician-patient privilege by enacting "An Act Concerning Witnesses."" 5 The

110. Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487, 492 (D. Kan. 1991); Doe v. Eli Lilly &
Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding a constructive waiver of the

vhole physician-patient relationship without making a distinction between the
testimonial privilege and the confidential relationship); Langdon v. Champion, 745
P.2d 1371, 1373 (Alaska 1987); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A. 2d 1257, 1259 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1985).
111. See Doe, 99 F.R.D. at 129; Green, 501 A.2d at 1259; State ex rel.
Stufflebam, 694 S.W.2d at 888; Stempler, 495 A.2d at 864 ("Since it is unrealistic to
anticipate that [plaintiffs] physicians will participate in such interviews without
plaintiff's consent, plaintiff's counsel should provide written authorization to facilitate
the conduct of interviews."). See generally Jones, supra note 76, § 4.
112. See King v. Ahrens, 798 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Bohrer v.
Merrill-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 217, 218 (D.N.D. 1987); Alston v.
Greater Southeast Community Hospital, 107 F.R.D. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 1985).
113. Bryant, 136 F.R.D. at 492-93; Bohrer, 122 F.R.D. at 218 ("[I]t appears that
the refusal to communicate is the personal choice of the physician."); Alston, 107
F.R.D. at 38; Langdon, 745 P.2d at 1374; Stempler, 495 A.2d at 864.
114. WIGMORE, supra note 46, § 2380, at 820. New York enacted the first
physician-patient privilege statute in 1828. See also supra note 40.
115. 1835 Mo. LAws An Act Concerning Witnesses, § 17, p. 6 2 3 . The act read:

No person authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be required or
allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired from any
patient, while attending him in a professional character, and which
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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current physician-patient privilege, which is codified at Missouri Revised
Statutes section 491.060(5), states:" 6
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify ...(5) A
physician licensed under chapter 334, RSMo, a licensed psychologist or a dentist licensed under chapter 332, RSMo, concerning
any information which he may have acquired from any patient
while attending him in a professional character, and which
information was necessary to enable him to prescribe and
for such patient as a physician, psychologist
provide treatment
7
or dentist.1
Early Missouri cases found that this statutory privilege was absolute, and
that the plaintiff did not have the power to waive the privilege."' In
Harriman v. Stowe," 9 the plaintiff claimed that she sustained injuries
The plaintiff's treating
attributable to the defendant's negligence. 20
physician attempted to testify regarding the extent of her injuries upon her
request, but the trial court disallowed the testimony, finding that the physicianpatient privilege rendered him incompetent to testify.'
The first case allowing the patient to waive the privilege was Groll v.
Tower,' decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1884. The Groll court
based its decision to allow waiver of the privilege by the plaintiff upon
decisions in other jurisdictions, and "the reason of the rule."'" In State v.

Long,'24 the court expanded upon the scope of the waiver found in Groll,
and held that once a plaintiff called one physician to testify, she had waived

information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such a patient as
a physician, or do any act for him as a surgeon.
116. Even though the statute is phrased in terms of "incompetency," it is clearly
a privilege rather than a rule of incompetency. See MCCORMICK, supra note 41,
§§ 72-73.
117. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(5) (Supp. 1993).
118. Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93 (1874); State ex reL McNutt v. Keet, 432
S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. 1968).
119. 57 Mo. 93 (1874).
120. Id. at 94-95.
121. Id.
at 95. The Missouri Supreme Court ended up allowing the testimony
under the theory of resgestae. However, the supreme court did not overrule the trial
at 96-97.
court's determination that the privilege was absolute. Id.
122. Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249 (1884). See McNutt, 432 S.W.2d at 600 (stating
that Groll was the first case allowing waiver of the privilege).
123. Groll, 85 Mo. at 256.
124. 165 S.W. 748 (Mo. 1914).
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the physician-patient privilege as to all physicians concerning that issue, 5
In St. Louis Little Rock Hospital,Inc. v. Gaertner,2 6 the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District further delineated the scope of the waiver
when it found that "[t]he privilege can only be waived by the patient and that
the doctor
must protect the patient by asserting the privilege when applica27
ble."

Historically, Missouri courts have not found that the privilege has been
waived until the plaintiff has testified as to his or her condition and about the
treatment given, or until the physician has actually been called as a witness. 8 The Missouri Supreme Court changed that rule and expanded the
scope of the physician-patient privilege waiver in State ex rel. McNutt v.
Keet.' In McNutt, the court found that the material effect of the waiver
was "largely a matter of timing as to when the waiver, inevitably to occur, is
to be recognized,"' 3 ° and held that "once the matter of plaintiffs physical
condition is in issue under the pleadings, plaintiff will be considered to have
waived the privilege under section 491.060(5) so far as information ...
bearing on that issue is concerned."'' However, the McNutt court did limit
the waiver in that it did not "automatically exten[d] to every doctor or hospital
record a party has had from birth regardless of the bearing or lack of bearing,
as may be, on the matters in issue."'3
Missouri courts have been inconsistent in determining whether a "McNutt
waiver"'3 is a waiver of just the privilege or a waiver of the privilege and
135
34
In State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist,
the confidential relationship.
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District found that the plaintiff
had waived the privilege upon filing suit and also found that a "[w]aiver of
125. Id.at 753. Accord Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 267 S.W. 400 (Mo.
1924).
126. 682 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
127. State v. Beatty, 770 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing St. Louis
Little Rock Hospital v. Gaertner, 682 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)).
128. See Baker v. Baker, 251 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. 1952); Epstein v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 156 S.W. 699, 705 (Mo. 1913).
129. 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968).
130. Id at 601.
131. Id.

132. Id.
at 602.
133. "McNutt waiver" is a term the Missouri Supreme Court used in Brandt H to
refer to the situation in which a plaintiff files a lawsuit that has his or her medical
condition as an issue. Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 671-72. The McNutt court had held
that by filing such pleadings, a plaintiff was deemed to have waived the physician-

patient privilege. McNutt,432 S.W.2d at 601.
134. See infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.

135. 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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the physician-patient privilege does not terminate all effects of the physicianpatient relationship."' 36 After balancing the competing interests in determining whether ex parte communications should be allowed as a matter of policy,
the Stufflebam court determined that ex parte interviews were not improper;
thus, the physician-patient confidential relationship, as well as the physicianpatient privilege, had been waived.'37 The Stufflebam court then required
the trial court to compel the plaintiff to issue medical authorizations to his or
her treating physicians stating the plaintiff's consent to ex parte contacts
between the physicians and the defendant's attorney(s).' 38 The Stufflebam
court noted that although the trial court could compel the authorizations, it
could not compel the plaintiffs treating physician to engage in ex parte
interviews. 39
Stufflebam was overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Woytus v. Ryan. 40 Like the Southern District in Stufflebam, the supreme
court in Woytus maintained that a waiver of the physician-patient privilege did
not necessarily constitute a waiver of the physician-patient relationship, and
that "[tIhe physician's ethical obligations continue, as do the physician's
fiduciary obligations" after the privilege has been waived.'' Noting that the
discovery rules neither expressly allowed nor prohibited ex parte communications, the Woytus court determined that "[a] public policy assessment is

136. Id.at 885. Missouri courts have long recognized that a fiduciary relationship
exists between a doctor and patient. State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127,
128 (Mo. 1978) ("'The relationship is one of trust and confidence; ... it is the duty
of the physician to exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with his patient, not only
in professional matters, but in all other relationships.' [T]his duty contemplates the
physician's undivided loyalty to his patient ... .") (quoting 70 C.J.S. Physicians&
Surgeons § 36 (now § 58) (1987))); Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961) ("A physician occupies a position of trust and confidence as regards his
patient-a fiduciary position.").

137. Id. at 886-89. The Stuffelbam court weighed the doctor's ethical duties of
non-disclosure, the possibility of "undue pressure" being brought to bear upon the
physician, the possibility that the physician may be liable to the plaintiff for breach of
confidence, and the prospect that the doctor's disclosures in an ex parte conference
may have constituted an invasion of privacy, on one hand, against the policy that "no
party to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to any witness's
evidence," id. at 888, the probability that the parties would engage in unethical
behavior, the ease of scheduling and reduced cost of informal witness interviews, and
the possibility of work-product violations, on the other hand. Id. at 886-88.
138. Id. at 888.
139. Id. "I would emphasize that a decision to grant an interview is not without
risk, and must be strictly voluntary." Id. at 889 (Hogan, J., concurring).
140. 776 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Mo. 1989).
141. Id. at 393.
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required to resolve the question" of whether ex parte communications are
allowable.'42 The court balanced the "conservation of both medical and

legal resources," the increased "spontaneity and candor" during ex parte
contacts that would aid in discovering the truth, and the increased probability
for "early evaluation and settlement of cases" against "the harm to the
physician-patient relationship inherent in ex parte discussion"'143 and the
opportunity for compromising "the physician's duty of loyalty to the
patient,"' 44 and determined that the defendant should be confined to the use
of discovery enumerated in the rules of civil procedure.'45 Therefore, the
waiver of the physician-patient confidential relationship applied only to formal
discovery. In reaching that holding, the Woytus court stated that the trial court
lacked authority to compel plaintiff to issue medical authorizations to his
physicians.'
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District applied the
Stuflebam rule in McClelland v. Ozenberger,47 even though Stufflebam had
been overruled by Woytus, 48 and determined that ex parte communications
between the plaintiffs treating physician and defense counsel were improper
because defendant did not make a motion to compel the plaintiff to issue
medical authorizations.' 49 However, the court stated in dicta that it agreed
with the policy as expressed in Woytus and that ex parte discussions should
be discouraged. 5
In summary, the law in Missouri regarding the physician-patient
relationship prior to the Brandt cases was that: (1) the physician-patient
privilege was waived upon the plaintiff filing a lawsuit in which his or her
medical condition was an issue as to all relevant medical issues and all
physicians who treated the plaintiff for injuries concerning those issues; (2)
such a "McNutt waiver" did not necessarily waive the physician's fiduciary

142. Id.
at 394.
143. Id. As a part of this harm, the court identified the possibility that there may
be "disclosure of irrelevant, privileged medical information" and that, assuming
plaintiff can determine such inappropriate disclosure occurred, no relief can "restore
at 394-95.
the patient's trust and confidence in the physician." Id.
144. Id.at 394. Included in this discussion was the potential for unethical
conduct on the part of defense attorneys. Id.
145. Id. at 395.
146. Id.The court did not answer the question of whether ex parte communications without judicially compelled authorization were improper.
147. 805 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
148. Since the facts in McClellandarose before Woytus was handed down, the
appellate court determined that Stufflebam, rather than Woytus, applied. Id at 267.
149. Id.
at 268.
150. Id.
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duty of confidentiality; and (3) a court could not compel the plaintiff to issue
medical authorizations allowing the plaintiff's treating physicians to engage
in ex parte communications. Whether ex parte communications between a
plaintiffs treating physician and defense counsel were permissible without a
court-compelled or voluntary authorization was not clear under the law.
IV. INSTANT DECISIONS
A. Brandt v. Pelican [Brandt I]
The decision in Brandt I addressed the question of whether the plaintiff
was entitled to a new trial when his treating physicians engaged in unauthorized ex parte interviews with defense counsel. The Missouri Supreme Court,
in a majority opinion, determined that prior cases conceming the issue of ex
parte communications had incorrectly assumed that Missouri Revised Statutes
section 491.060(5) "encompasse[d] all of the law of physician-patient
The court concluded that section 491.060(5) prohibited only
privilege."''
the "disclosure of confidential medical information by testimony in court or
by formal discovery."'5 2 Therefore, there was no statutory or common law
authority in Missouri for granting the plaintiff a new trial because of his
physicians' ex parte conferences. However, the court did state that a
physician was bound by a fiduciary obligation not to disclose confidential
However, the court noted that such an obligation
medical information.'
was not determinative of whether the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial.'54
The court deferred the question of whether ex parte communications between
a plaintiffs treating physicians and defense counsel might give rise to civil
damages to its decision in Brandt IV'"5

B. Brandt v. Medical Defense Associates [Brandt II]
In Brandt 1I, the Missouri Supreme Court held that absent waiver, a
plaintiffs treating physician who engages in ex parte communications with

151. Brandt 1, 856 S.W.2d at 661. Since both Stufflebam and Woytus used a
balancing test to determine whether ex parte communciations were allowable and
recognized that the physician had a duty of confidentiality beyond the physician-patient
privilege, it is not clear upon what bases the court reached this conclusion. See supra
notes 136-37 and 141-46 for those courts' conclusions.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 662.
154. Id.
155. Id
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defense counsel is liable to the plaintiff for civil damages.' 6 The Brandt
I court reiterated its holding in Brandt I and stated that Missouri Revised
Statutes section 491.060(5) does not create a fiduciary duty of confidentiality;
it creates only a testimonial privilege.5 7 The court did find that the
physician had a fiduciary duty not to disclose confidential information, but this
"fiduciary duty of confidentiality" was based upon public policy, not the
physician-patient privilege statute or upon common law.' The court found
that seven statutes which permit disclosure of confidential information by a
physician in limited circumstances expressed the policy that physicians have
a fiduciary duty to keep their patient's medical information confidential.5 9

156. Brandt 1H, 856 S.W.2d at 674. Note that in Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d
51 (Mo. 1993), a case handed down by the Missouri Supreme Court on the same day
as the Brandt cases, the court held that no confidential relationship or privilege exists
between a plaintiff and a physician who is to testify on behalf of the plaintiff as an
expert, but never treated the plaintiff in a professional capacity. Id. at 54. Therefore,
ex parte communications with such a physician are permissible without the limitations
enumerated in the Brandt cases. Id.
157. Brandt H1, 856 S.W.2d at 669.
158. Id. at 670-71. The "fiduciary duty of confidentiality" is the same as tile
"physician-patient confidential relationship."
159. Id. The court gave the following summary of the seven cited statutes:
See § 578.353, RSMo 1986 (a physician is immune from civil liability
when making report that a patient was treated for a gunshot wound);
§ 334.265, RSMo Supp. 1992 (notwithstanding the rules of confidentiality,
a physician who treats a patient who appears to be intoxicated for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident may make a report to the highway
patrol); § 192.067, RSMo Supp. 1992 (a physician may give the department
of health information concerning a patient for epidemiological studies to
safeguard the health of citizens of Missouri and will not be held either
civilly or criminally liable for divulging confidential information);
§ 191.737, RSMo Supp. 1992 (notwithstanding the physician-patient
privilege, a physician may report to the department of health children who
may have been exposed to a controlled substance and is immune from civil
liability); § 188.070, RSMo 1986 (a physician who does not maintain the
confidentiality of records perfaining to abortions is guilty of a misdemeanor
and is to be punished as required by law); § 191.743, RSMo 1992 (if a
physician receives consent from a high-risk pregnant woman to make a
report to the department of health, this consent is deemed a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege and the physician has immunity from civil
liability); § 191.656, RSMo Supp. 1992 (a patient's HIV infection status or
the results of HIV testing shall be kept strictly confidential by a physician
unless there is an explicit exception provided by this statute. If an
exception applies, the physician will not be civilly liable.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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Additionally, the existence of the physician's ethical duty of nondisclosure
expressed a policy favoring the existence of a fiduciary duty of confidentiality
on the part of a physician. 60 Consequently, the court found that when
confidential medical information is disclosed and the "duty of confidentiality
has not been waived, the patient has a cause of action for damages in tort
against the physician." '
Therefore, the main issue decided by the court in determining the
allowability of ex parte interviews was whether a "McNutt waiver" waived the
fiduciary duty of confidentiality as well as the testimonial privilege. The court
revisited its decision in State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet,162 in which it held that

the plaintiff was deemed to have constructively waived the privilege by filing

a lawsuit that placed his or her medical condition at issue. 6 The court
noted that McNutt did not distinguish between the testimonial privilege and the
physician's fiduciary duty of confidentiality." 4 To resolve this issue, the
Brandt II court considered whether a constructive waiver could only be a
partial one. 6" The court recognized that it had always rejected the idea of
a partial waiver," thus necessitating the conclusion that a patient could not
waive the physian-patient privilege without also waiving the physician's
fiduciary duty of confidentiality. Therefore, ex parte communications were
not improper after the plaintiff placed his or her medical condition at
issue. 67
The Brandt II court pointed to several practical reasons why this outcome
was justified. In support of the notion that any waiver is a full waiver, the
court reasoned that once any confidential information is disclosed, that
information is no longer confidential, thus leaving nothing for the fiduciary
duty of confidentiality to protect. 68 Additionally, the court relied on the
evidentiary maxim that a patient should not be allowed to use a privilege as
both "a shield and a dagger at one and the same time," 69 and concluded that

160. Id. at 670-71.
161. Id. at 670. Also, it should be noted that the Brandt 1I decision did not
consider the plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim, thus rejecting by implication an
invasion of privacy cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
162. 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968). See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying
text for a discussion of McNutt.
163. Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 671. See also supra notes 129-32.
164. Brandt I, 856 S.W.2d at 671.
165. Id. at 672.
166. Id. ("[O]nce there is a waiver, it is a full waiver.") (citing Baker v. Baker,

251 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1952) and Elliott v. Kansas City, 96 S.W. 1023 (Mo. 1906)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id (quoting McNutt, 432 S.W.2d at 601, and citing Smart v. Kansas City,
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the physician should be able to receive input from all parties to a lawsuit, and
that "the physician's fiduciary duty of confidentiality should [not] be used to
170
manipulate or in any way influence the testimony of the physician."'
Moreover, the physician's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff does not include the
duty to give favorable testimony.'
The "primary obligation that the
172
treating physician or any other witness owes in a trial is to tell the truth."'
The court also recognized that doctors are more difficult to deal with than
other witnesses because they are usually very busy and the scheduling of
depositions is extremely difficult. 73 Finally, because of the technical and
scientific nature of the physician's testimony, a large amount of advance
preparation is often necessary."
Therefore, the Brandt II court held that when a plaintiff places his or her
medical condition at issue in a lawsuit, the plaintiff waives the physicianpatient privilege as well as the physician's fiduciary duty of confidentiality.' However, as an addendum, the court defined the scope of this waiver
by stating that the physician can only disclose confidential information that is
at issue in the lawsuit. 76 Any disclosure that exceeds the scope of the
waiver will subject the physician to liability under the tort of "breach of
fiduciary duty."' 77

105 S.W. 709, 722 (Mo. 1907) (Lamm, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
at 673.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
at 674.
174. Id,
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.On March 29, 1994, the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of
Appeals decided the first post-Brandt case concerning ex parte communications
between plaintiff's treating physician(s) and defense counsel. State ex rel. Norman v.
Dalton, No. 64834, 1994 WL 97765 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1994). Norman involved
action for personal injury arising from a automobile accident. The plaintiff issued a
medical authorization for release of medical records to her physicians but stated that
she did not consent to ex parte communications with defense counsel. The trial judge
found this restriction in the authorization to be proper. The defendant brought an
action for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals. The Eastern District applied
the supreme court's ruling in the Brandt cases and determined that it was improper for
the trial judge to allow such a restriction in the authorization, finding that the plaintiff
had waived the physician's duty of confidentiality as well as the physician-patient
privilege by filing a lawsuit in which her medical condition was an issue. Id.
at *2.
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C. Concurrences...
Judge Covington concurred in the result in both Brandt 179 and Brandt
1I80 but disagreed with the majority's reasoning. Judge Covington
expressed the view that the physician-patient confidential relationship should
not be waived merely by the filing of a lawsuit by the plaintiff that places his

or her medical condition at issue.' 8' Judge Covington expressed concern
that the physician would be placed in the dilemma of being pressured by the
plaintiff not to engage in ex parte conferences and by the defendant to
As a solution to this dilemma, she
participate in ex parte conferences.'
proposed a rule that ex parte conferences could not occur until the physician's
deposition was taken by the defense.'83 Judge Covington claimed that this
compromise would give protection to the plaintiff and physician, while
allowing the defendant time to prepare the physiciari for testimony if it is
desired by the defendant.' 84
Judge Holstein concurred in the result of Brandt I, stating that the
plaintiff s petition did not state a valid cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.' 85 However, he disagreed with the majority's ruling that ex parte
positing that permitting such contacts is prejudicial
interviews are allowable,
186
plaintiff.
to the
V. COMMENT
A. The Court's Legal Analysis
A distinguishing feature of the Brandt cases is that the court did not
expressly balance competing policy interests in reaching its result that ex parte
communications between a plaintiff's treating physicians and defense counsel

178. Judge Covington concurred to both Brandt I and Brandt I in a single
concurrence at the end of Brandt L Brandt 1, 856 S.W.2d at 665-67 (Covington, J.,
concurring). Judge Holstein joined Judge Covington in her concurrence to Brandt I,
but concurred separately in Brandt11. Brandt , 856 S.W.2d at 675-76 (Holstein, J.,
concurring).
179. Brandt 1, 856 S.W.2d at 665-67 (Covington, J., concurring).
180. Brandt1, 856 S.W.2d at 675 (Covington, J., concurring) (stating the reasons
for concurrence in Brandt II in the concurrence to Brandt 1).
181. Brandt 1, 856 S.W.2d at 666 (Covington, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 666-67 (Covington, J., concurring).
184. Id.
185. Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 675 (Holstein, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 676.
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are permissible." 7 The courts in every other jurisdiction, and every
previous Missouri decision that has considered this issue, have engaged in a
balancing test that weighed "the patient's privacy interest in non-disclosure,
on the one hand, and the public's interest in full disclosure to obtain a just
disposition of the controversy, on the other [hand]."' 88 However, instead of
looking to policy, 8 9 the Brandt court focused on established evidentiary
rules to determine whether a waiver of the confidential relationship had
occurred." 9 It decided as a matter of evidentiary law that a waiver cannot
be a partial one, and that an established theory behind the rules of evidence
is that a patient cannot use a privileged relationship as a tactical advantage.'" The justifications the court gave for its decision were practical in
nature and not policy based."'.
In addition to resolving the ex parte issue, the court definitively stated
that a physician has a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidential nature of
information disclosed by a patient, and any breach of this fiduciary duty gives

187. However, in their concurrances, Judges Covington and Holstein did adopt
balancing tests in concluding that ex parte communications between a plaintiff's
treating physicians and defense counsel should be disallowed. Brandt 1,856 S.W.2d
at 666; Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 675.
188. Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1984). See supra notes 137 and
142-44 and accompanying text for prior Missouri decisions using a balancing test. See
supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text for courts in other jurisdictions using a
balancing test.
189. Note that in determining whether Missouri recognized the physician's
fiduciary duty of confidentiality as a matter of state law the court did look to policy
as evidenced in statutes that supported the existence of the confidential relationship by
implication and prior court decisions, Brandt 11, 856 S.W.2d at 670, but the issue of
whether a physician has a fiduciary duty of confidentiality towards his or her patient

is distinct from whether that duty of confidentiality is waived upon the patient filing
a lawsuit
190.
191.
192.
summary

in which his or her medical condition is an issue.
Id.at 672-73.
Id,
Id.at 672-74. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text for a
of the Brandt II court's practical justifications. Note that the line between

a resulting practical benefit and a public policy determination is a fine one to draw.
The distinction is that a practical justification is an after-the-fact benefit of an
established rule, whereas a policy consideration helps to establish the rule. For
example, in Brandt 11,the court stated that allowing ex parte communications would
make it easier for the defendant to coordinate physicians as witnesses. Brandt 11, 856
S.W.2d at 674. The court called this benefit a "practical reason" since it was justifying
the rule it had established previously in the decision, and not a policy consideration,
since it was not a factor the court claimed to have considered in determining the rule
that ex parte communications were allowable.
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rise to an action in tort against the physician. 93 The significance of this
determination should not be overlooked. By establishing a clear and definite
fiduciary relationship and a corresponding cause of action, the court is
expanding the physician-patient confidential relationship. Now, a patient is
assured of the confidentiality of the information disclosed to a doctor (unless
the patient expressly or constructively consents to disclosure), whereas before
the Brandt decisions there were conflicting determinations as to whether the
confidential relationship was subject to judicial protection outside the
testimonial privilege. 94 Furthermore, the conclusion that an unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information constitutes a tort is preferable to the
other causes of actions, such as implied contract, invasion of privacy, or
implied cause of action based on statute, that have been recognized in some

other jurisdictions.'

These other causes of action are inadequate to protect

the interests of the wronged patient.'96

at 670.
193. Id.
194. Compare State v. Beatty, 770 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding

that the privilege statute only applied to "testimony," and extra-judicial disclosures of
confidential information by a psychiatrist were not prohibited because of the limited
nature of the statute) with State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Mo.
1989) (finding that the physician-patient relationship extended beyond testimony and
barred court-compelled waivers authorizing ex parte communications between
plaintiff's treating physicians and defense counsel).
195. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible

causes of action for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by a physician.
196. Invasion of privacy is deficient because it protects interests that "only

partially overlap with the interests present in a confidential relationship." Alan B.
Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. RaV. 1426,
1439 (1982). Moreover, the invasion of privacy requirement of publication is not
normally met in unauthorized disclosure of confidential information cases; the invasion
of privacy requirement that the disclosure be "highly offensive" is hard to meet, and
the "legitimate public interest" and "public figure" doctrines also limit the ability of an
invasion of privacy cause of action to protect a patient's confidential disclosures of

information. Id, at 1439-44.
An implied contract cause of action is ill suited to enforce a confidential
relationship because "[t]he duty present in a confidential relationship and the injury
suffered when that duty is violated are characteristic of the duties and injuries

associated with tort law and are foreign to contract law" and many times a physicianpatient relationship is created when there is no consideration that can give rise to a
contractual relationship. Id. at 1444-45. Tort-type damages are better suited than
contract-type damages to compensate a patient injured by unauthorized disclosure, and

contract defenses such as statute of frauds, parol evidence rule, capacity, and lack of
consideration may bar a patient's recovery. Id. at 1445-46.
An implied statutory cause of action is deficient in that it causes the court to
"undertake the uncertain business of trying to determine what the legislature intended
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B. PracticalJustifications
In determining whether ex parte communications between a plaintiffs
treating physicians and defense counsel were permissible, the Missouri
Supreme Court had three possible rules it could have adopted concerning
when the physician-patient relationship was waived. 9 7 It could have found:
(1) that the entire physician-patient relationship' 98 is constructively waived
upon a plaintiff filing a lawsuit in which his or her medical condition is at
issue; 9 (2) that the entire physician-patient relationship may be constructively waived either in whole or in part, and that the scope of the waiver is to
be determined on a case-by-case basis; or (3) that there may be a constructive
waiver of the physician-patient relationship as to testimony and formal
discovery, but there can never be a constructive waiver of the relationship as
to extra-judicial disclosures.

By holding that ex parte communications are permissible once the

plaintiff has joined his or her medical condition as an issue to a lawsuit, the
Brandt court adopted the first option as the rule in Missouri. This option is
preferable to the other possible rules. Although the second option, determining the extent of constructive waiver on a case-by-case basis, may provide the
most equitable result,2 . it would furnish little guidance to physicians on

or would have intended had it thought of the situation at bar" and many times the
purpose of a statute is not relevant to the particular issue in question when there is an
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Id. at 1447-48.
197. See also Paul M. Brown and Paul A. Kidwell, Righting the Wrong of
Woytus: A Proposalfor Adoption of a Rule in Missouri Creatinga New Category of
Depositions Which May be Usedfor Discovery Purposes Only, 56 MO. L. REV. 76
(1991) (suggesting the use of "discovery depositions" as a solution to the inequity
created by disallowing ex parte contacts between defense counsel and plaintiff's
treating physicians).
198. The physician-patient relationship includes the physician-patient testimonial
privilege and the physician-patient confidential relationship (also called the physician's
fiduciary duty of confidentiality).
199. "Constructive waiver" is the waiver that is deemed to occur upon the filing
of a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs medical condition is an issue. See supra notes
108-10 and accompanying text.
200. The physician-patient relationship exists in large part to encourage the patient
to disclose potentially embarrassing and private information to a physician. See supra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text; Chafee, supra note 37, at 609. Therefore, it
would make sense for the physician to be held to a lesser standard of care in guarding
the disclosure of confidential information when medical information does not concern
a particularly embarrassing or private condition-such as a broken leg-as opposed to
requiring a greater standard of care concerning a condition that is potentially
embarrassing or private-such as gonorrhea. See generally Morgan, supra note 41, at
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/5
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what information they could legally disclose without a breach of fiduciary
duty, or to lower courts for determining under what circumstances the
fiduciary duty of confidentiality has been breached. The rule adopted by the
Brandt court, that all aspects of the physician-patient relationship can be
constructively waived, is superior in that it is a bright line rule that is easy to
understand and it provides ample guidance to physicians and lower courts.
The third option, that the testimonial privilege is constructively waived, but

the confidential relationship outside of testimony is never constructively
waived, is the rule followed by most jurisdictions that do not allow ex parte
communications between a plaintiff's treating physicians and defense
counsel.2"' Although this option, like the rule adopted by the Brandt court,
provides a bright line, it goes too far in attempting to preserve the confidential
nature of the physician-patient relationship. The physician's ethical duties
provide substantial protection of a patient's confidential information,2 "2 but
most courts that prohibit ex parte interviews with a plaintiffs treating
physician overlook this inherent protection found in the physicians' ethical
code. More often, those courts prohibit such communications, citing the
physicians' ethical code as a reason for the prohibition, 3 instead of viewing
the physicians' ethical code as an additional protection of confidential
information. Furthermore, a rule disallowing ex parte communications with
a plaintiffs treating physicians attempts to ensure the confidentiality of the
physician-patient relationship at the expense of the defendant. Allowing a
plaintiff to have free access to potentially important facts and/or expert
witnesses while requiring the defendant to use more expensive, inconvenient,
and burdensome formal discovery methods tilts the litigation playing field in
favor of the plaintiff. "° Moreover, although the defendant may have access

290. A balancing test when a patient's interest in nondisclosure is weighed against
society's interest in the fair and efficient determination of lawsuits can be truly
accurate only when performed on a case-by-case basis, since the plaintiff's interest in
nondisclosure necessarily varies with the type of medical condition being litigated, and
since society's interest in a fair and efficient determination of the lawsuit arguably
varies with the gravity and possible collateral effects of the claim being litigated.
201. See supranotes 108-09 and accompanying text.
202. Violation of the physicians' code of ethics may result in censure, or
suspension or revocation of the doctor's medical license. See supra note 59.
203. These courts claim that ex parte communications with physicians must be
forbidden in order to protect the physicians from inadvertently violating their ethical
and fiduciary obligations to patients. See supranotes 87-92 and accompanying text.

However, it seems more reasonable to view the physician's ethical and fiduciary duties
as protection of confidential information. With the physician's ethical duty not to
disclose already protecting the patient's confidential medical information, there seems

to be little reason to prohibit ex parte communications with defense counsel.
204. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (stating that not requiring
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to greater resources than does the plaintiff, a lawsuit most likely will
personally cost the defendant more than it will the plaintiff."' This
apparent inequity makes it essential that the defendant be provided with equal
access to witnesses. Related to this argument is the conclusion that any
reduction in the cost of litigation for defendants that results by allowing ex
parte interviews with a plaintiffs treating physicians will correspondingly
reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice and personal injury
lawsuits, since any reduced cost of litigation to the defendant will decrease the

"nuisance value" of those kinds of actions." 6

formal discovery results in decreased litigation costs and preparation for a lawsuit).

205. Since a plaintiff usually pays his or her lawyer on a contingent fee basis,
litigation is near risk-free to the plaintiff. However, the defendant usually must pay
his or her attorney by the hour, resulting in great expense regardless of the outcome
of the case. See Dennis McLellan, Surfeit of Civil Suits Is a Crime, Advocate of Tort
Reform Says, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, at El ("All of this [the litigation explosion]
'is partly based on the fact that we have the contingency fee system of litigation....
The fact that litigation is risk free means the plaintiff can attack you and put you
through the legal mill for five years or more without any real risk,'.... ." (quoting
Robert V. Wills, author of LAWYERS ARE KILLING AMERICA: A TRIAL LAWYER'S
APPEAL FOR GENUINE TORT REFORM (1990))).
This is not to say that all or most claims by plaintiffs are "frivolous." However,
the contingent fee system does increase the propensity of frivolous claims. William
Raspberry, Outlandish Claims, OutrageousSettlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1986, at

A19; Jeffrey O'Connell and Michael Horowitz, The Lawyer Will See You Now:
Health Reform's Tort Crisis, WASH. POST, June 13, 1993, at C3. ("'No one involved
has any incentive to moderation or reasonableness. The victim has every reason to
exaggerate his losses. It is some other person's insurance company that must pay....
Delay, fraud, [and] contentiousness are maximized, and in the process the system
becomes grossly inefficient and expensive."') (quoting Professor (later Senator) Daniel
P. Moynihan). But see William Mullen, In U.S., Court Is Now The FirstResort, CHI.
TRIB., July 21, 1991, at 1. (citing Stanford University Law Professor Lawrence

Friedman, and stating that before the contingent fee system, wealthy defendants had
an advantage over plaintiffs, and could spend them to death).
206. "Nuisance value" is generally the cost of the litigation to the defendant. The
theory is that defendants will be willing to settle for at least what the litigation would
cost them if it went through full litigation. See also WIGMORE, supranote 46, § 2380,
at 831 (stating that in "actions on policies of life insurance where the deceased's
misrepresentations of his health are involved, [and] actions for corporal injuries where
the extent of the plaintiffs injury is at issue.., the advancement of fraudulent claims
is notoriously common").
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VI. CONCLUSION

The state of the law concerning the physician-patient relationship is one
of confusion and contradiction. Most states recognize the physician-patient
privilege whereas most experts question the necessity and desirability of such

a privilege. Some courts distinguish between the physician-patient testimonial
privilege and the physician-patient confidential relationship; other courts find
that the testimonial privilege also applies to extra-judicial disclosures." 7
Some courts that allow ex parte communications between plaintiff's treating
physicians and defense counsel require the plaintiff to issue authorizations;
other courts that allow ex parte contacts do not require authorizations."'
Moreover, since most courts use a balancing test of public policy
considerations 9 in determining the permissibility of ex parte contacts with
plaintiffs treating physicians, it is difficult to predict which side of ex parte
issue any one court will fall. Predicting the judicial determination of a
physician-patient relationship issue is even more difficult when the frequency
of reversals in this area of the law is considered. 0
JOHN JENNINGS

207. See supra note 49.
208. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 82.
210. For instance, in Missouri, the Brandtdecisions overrule State exrel. Woytus
v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989), which in turn overruled State ex rel Stuffelbam
v. Applequist, 694 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Michigan, Domako v. Rowe,

475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1991), overruled Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 429
N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). In Montana, Callahan v. Burton, 487 P.2d 515
(Mont. 1971), was overruled by Jaap v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit,
623 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 1981).
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